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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the district court's ruling of October 2, 2015 ("Order") 
to allow Eagle Mountain City ("City") to pursue its claims against Parsons, Kinghorn, 
Harris ("PKH"), represented by the counsel of its choice, Snell & Wilmer. The district 
court correctly found that the Settlement Agreement and Contingent Fee Agreement 
(collectively, the "Agreements"), executed by and between the City, Cedar Valley Water 
Company ("Cedar Valley"), and Snell & Wilmer did not expressly assign the City's legal 
malpractice claim against PKH to Cedar Valley. The district court erred, however, by 
misinterpreting the Agreements' language, making inferences against the City as the non-
moving party, and ignoring several critical, undisputed facts. These errors led to the 
incorrect conclusion that the Agreements constituted a "partial," implied assignment of a 
legal malpractice claim that Utah law purportedly would not permit. This was error 
because the undisputed record evidence showed that the City did not transfer substantial 
control or a substantial portion of its property rights to Cedar Valley. The City (1) 
brought this lawsuit in its own name as the sole plaintiff, (2) selected Snell & Wilmer to 
represent the City based on Snell & Wilmer's knowledge and experience with the claims, 
(3) controlled all aspects of the litigation, and (4) agreed to share an equal portion-not a 
substantial portion-of any recovery against PKH with Snell & Wilmer and Cedar 
Valley. 
Finally, the district court erred and deprived the City of its inherent right to choice 
of counsel by holding that the City could refile its malpractice claims only if it could 
establish that the litigation is not controlled by Cedar Valley and that the City is not 
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represented by attorneys "associated" with Cedar Valley. PKH now seeks to expand this 
ruling into a perpetual disqualification of Snell & Wilmer, although a motion to 
disqualify was never filed. 
RESPONSE TO PKH'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties appear to agree generally on the relevant facts. However, PKH was 
wrong about the following points: 
A. Snell & Wilmer Does Not Jointly Represent the City and Cedar 
Valley in this Case. 
In its brief, PKH repeatedly said that the City and Cedar Valley "agreed ... to 
jointly retain [Snell & Wilmer] to represent them and to prosecute the Malpractice Case 
against PKH." (PKH Br. at 3.) Nowhere in the Contingent Fee Agreement does it state 
that the City and Cedar Valley retained Snell & Wilmer to jointly represent the City and 
Cedar Valley in this case. (See R. 3365-73.) Rather, the Contingent Fee Agreement 
recites that the "City and Cedar Valley desire to retain [Snell & Wilmer] to bring the 
Lawsuit against PKH, in part, because [Snell & Wilmer] has extensive experience with 
and knowledge of the facts and has developed evidence supporting the City's claims 
against PKH in the Lawsuit." (R. 3365, at~ D (emphasis added).) Cedar Valley brought 
no claims, owns no claims, and is not a party to this case. (R. 1-24.) 
The Contingent Fee Agreement does include a "Joint Representation" provision 
because, as it clearly states, attorneys are prohibited "from representing multiple parties 
in matters involving the same subject matter without full disclosure and written waiver by 
the parties." Such informed disclosure was necessary because Snell & Wilmer had 
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previously represented Cedar Valley in the Underlying Lawsuit that brought PKH's 
malpractice to the City's attention. (R. 3367, at if 5.) This "Joint Representation" 
provision cannot be read to imply what PKH suggests-that Snell & Wilmer represented 
both the City and Cedar Valley in this case. There was and is no joint representation 
here. In fact, when PKH deposed Cedar Valley as a third-party witness in this case, 
Cedar Valley was independently represented by Florida counsel, and not by Snell & 
Wilmer. 
B. The Citv's Damae:es in the Underlying Lawsuit Were Not 
Capped at $420,000.00. 
PKH also claimed that "the district court [in the Underlying Lawsuit] ruled that 
[Cedar Valley] was only owed approximately $420,000, including prejudgment interest." 
(PKH Br. at 3 (emphasis added).) "Only" $420,000? This statement wrongly suggests 
that an interlocutory order of partial summary judgment somehow was a fmal order. It 
was not. Once the district court in the Underlying Lawsuit issued its preliminary rulings, 
the City realized its exposure started at $420,000, and soon learned that it could face 
much more exposure if the Underlying Lawsuit went to trial. 
PKH painfully understood this exposure. On November 13, 2012, less than three 
months before the settlement, PKH told the City that PKH "remain[ ed] very concerned 
about the outcome of the litigation" and that the "case is an absolute mess with a huge 
potential damage award." (R. 3418, at if 49.) A week later, on November 20, 2012, PKH 
told the City that the "best-case scenario" would be a final judgment in the amount of 
approximately $420,000, but the worst-case scenario would be a judgment of "about $6 
3 
million." (R. 3418-19, at~ 50.) It got worse. On December 4, 2012, PKH referred to the 
worst-case scenario as being a $7 million judgment. (R. 3420, at~ 55.) Then, on January 
15, 2013, PKH claimed it was right on its advice, but that it is "a hard thing to risk eight 
and a half million dollars." (R. 3420, at~ 56.) 
PKH's suggestion that the City's damages were capped in the Underlying Lawsuit 
at $420,000-and therefore that the City's agreement to pay Cedar Valley $4,560,000 
was unwarranted-is insupportable. (See PKH Br. at 3, n.6.) Based on PKH's own 
cautionary correspondence, the City faced potential exposure of up to $8.5 million when 
it reached a settlement to pay a little more than half that amount. 
C. PKH's Objections to Certain Declarations Were Implicitly 
Overruled. 
Recognizing that the district court improperly failed to make factual inferences in 
favor of the City, PKH next claimed that those facts did not belong in the record and that 
it had objected to the declarations of Ifo Pili (the City's administrator) and Heather 
Jackson (the City's mayor at the time of the Underlying Lawsuit and the settlement). 
(PKH Br. at 9-10.) It is true that PKH lodged certain objections in its reply memorandum 
in support of its motion for summary judgment. The district court never expressly ruled 
on PKH's objections, but it certainly overruled them by implication when it openly 
considered the declarations. (See R. 2627-28, 2635.) As PKH later had to admit, the 
district court claimed it considered "all the evidence, including the affidavits in deciding 
which facts were material and undisputed." (PKH Br. at 19.) Finally, PKH's objections 
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do not correct or justify the district court's disregard of the City's undisputed evidence, 
and its failure to make inferences in the City's favor. 
D. Cedar Valley Is Not Required to Consent to Any Settlement 
Between the City and PKH. 
Lastly, in its recitation of the facts, PKH initially claimed the City "cannot settle 
the Malpractice Case without [Cedar Valley's] consent." (PKH Br. at 14.) Later in its 
brief, however, PKH clarified that the City cannot "independently settl[ e] the malpractice 
claim without [Cedar Valley's] consent or a mandatory arbitration." (PKH Br. at 19 
(emphasis added); see also R. 3369, at § 7.) Based on PKH's own admission and the 
plain language of the Contingent Fee Agreement, Cedar Valley's consent is not required 
to effectuate a reasonable settlement. And, of course there is no dispute that PKH never 
presented an offer that interested the City, which means Cedar Valley had nothing to say 
about the litigation or settlement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
CITY ASSIGNED ITS LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM TO 
CEDAR VALLEY. 
The district court erred when it improperly broadened the language of the 
Agreements and ignored undisputed material facts. The Record does not support the 
district court's conclusion that the City "transfer[ed] to [Cedar Valley] a substantial level 
of . . . control over the litigation decisions and a substantial portion of [the City's] 
property rights." (R. 2640.) 
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Whether Utah allows assignments of legal malpractice claims is irrelevant here, 
because there was no assignment. Yet even if there were an assignment, Utah has 
approved some assignments. The City concedes that at some level, Utah would likely 
prohibit assignments bearing characteristics that are not present here. Therefore, in Utah 
there appears to be a sliding scale or range of circumstances that must be considered to 
determine whether there is a prohibited assignment. On one end of the spectrum could be 
the naked auctioning and selling of a malpractice claim on eBay or craigslist. On .the 
other end of the spectrum could be a mere promise to share a nickel of any malpractice 
recovery with a third party. What is known in Utah is that it is permissible and allowed 
for a legal malpractice claim to be sold to a total stranger. See, e.g., Snow, Nuffer, 
Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 1999 UT 49, if 19, 980 P.2d 208 (holding that the only 
limitation on the selling of a malpractice claim in bankruptcy is that the defendant law 
firm could not purchase it) (hereinafter "Snow"). Most importantly here, in Snow, the 
Court's concern was whether collusion would prevent the claim from being brought. 
That concern does not exist here. 
A. In Determining Whether a Legal Malpractice Claim Can Be 
Transferred, Utah Law Correctly Focuses on the Risk of 
Collusion. 
The Utah Supreme Court is not concerned with many of the public policy 
concerns that other jurisdictions consider when determining whether to permit the 
assignment of legal malpractice claims. This is evidenced by the Court's decision in 
Snow, which sanctioned the purchase of a legal malpractice claim from a bankruptcy 
estate or a judgment execution sale. Id. at ifif 10-11. In other words, regardless of 
6 
whether the Utah Supreme Court would ultimately adopt the majority rule for some 
circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court does allow a complete stranger to the attorney-
client relationship to purchase a legal malpractice claim, prosecute the claim in its own 
name against the injured client's former attorney, and keep all of the proceeds from any 
recovery. 
In its opposition brief, PKH attempted to minimize the significance of Snow to the 
current facts by arguing that a bankruptcy or judgment execution sale is an involuntary 
transfer. (PKH Br. at 33-34.) This is a distinction without a difference, and ignores the 
real concern of the Snow Court. The Court's approval of the transfer of a legal 
malpractice claim through a bankruptcy or judgment execution sale implicitly rejects 
many of the public policy concerns that PKH touts in support of its motion here. 
PKH claims that the following public policy reasons apply here: (1) the 
exploitation and merchandising of a legal malpractice claim; (2) the sanctity of the 
attorney-client relationship is not preserved; (3) there is an opportunity and incentive for 
collusion; and (4) it creates a shift in positions. (PKH Br. at 33-37.) Yet just as with a 
"voluntary" assignment-as PKH alleges occurred here-an "involuntary" transfer of a 
legal malpractice claim, too, allows a malpractice claim to be exploited and merchandised 
"to economic bidders who have never had a professional relationship with the attorney." 
Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 389, 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). 
Similarly, the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship is not preserved when a 
complete stranger to the attorney-client relationship is permitted to purchase a client's 
legal malpractice claim and pursue it against the client's former attorney. Yet Utah law 
7 
permits this. Finally, an involuntary transfer of a legal malpractice claim necessarily 
creates a change of positions, as does any prosecution of a legal malpractice claim-
assigned or otherwise. No matter who pursues a legal malpractice claim, the plaintiff 
must prove that the attorney was the cause of the injury, including that the positions 
originally relied upon were wrong and led to damages. Thus, a "role reversal" is inherent 
in any legal malpractice case, and no public policy is offended here. 
Of course the Utah Supreme Court is concerned with the risk of collusion, which 
is why the Court ultimately prohibited a law firm from purchasing a legal malpractice 
claim against itself. See Snow, 1999 UT 49 at ifif 12-18. PKH misunderstands the central 
concern there. The fear was collusion would lead to the claim never being brought, 
benefitting the malpracticing attorney. Here, in contrast, there is no evidence of 
collusion. And even if there were any evidence, the district court was obligated to make 
inferences against that evidence and allow the claims to go to a fact finder. And as in 
Snow, the Court does not need to decide whether legal malpractice claims are assignable 
under Utah law because the City did not assign its legal malpractice claim against PKH to 
Cedar Valley. Thus, the district court erred when it held that the Agreements constituted 
a partial, implied assignment and violated public policy. (R. 2641.) 
B. The District Court Failed To Consider the Undisputed 
Surrounding Circumstances. 
When it concluded there was a partial, implied assignment, the district court 
ignored the undisputed facts constituting the "surrounding circumstances." (Compare R. 
3828-33, R. 3950-58 with R. 2626-41.) In reaching its decision, the district court 
8 
recognized correctly that "'the creation and existence of an assignment is to be 
determined according to the intention of the parties, which is to be discerned not only 
from the instruments executed by them, if an [sic], but from the surrounding 
circumstances."' (R. 2635 (quoting 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 57 (2010) (emphases 
added)).) The district court correctly said it was required to consider the Agreements and 
the surrounding circumstances, yet declined without explanation to do so. 
Although the district court rejected the idea, PKH argued in opposition that the 
Agreements are integrated and the district court should not consider parol evidence. 
(PKH Br. at 31.) Since the district court correctly ruled that there was no express 
assignment, it had to look at the intention of the parties in order to determine whether 
there was an implied assignment. (R. 2635 (quoting 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 57 
(2010)).) The district court claimed it reviewed the affidavits and other evidence on file, 
but the court's ruling rests solely on the language of the Agreements and ignores the 
undisputed affidavit testimony presented by the City. (R. 2626-41.) As a result, the 
following rulings of the district court are in error and should be reversed. 
1. The filing of this lawsuit was not a condition to settlement. 
First, the district court held that the City assigned control of the litigation to Cedar 
Valley by agreeing to bring the lawsuit as a condition of settlement. (R. 2634; R. 2633 
(citing R. 3365, at if C).) This ignores the City's sworn statements that it was likely to 
bring the claims regardless of any settlement. (R. 3831-32 at if 17; see also R. 3957 at if 
15.) The more important point is that the undisputed facts prove the City did not file this 
lawsuit purely as a condition of settlement. The undisputed facts and all inferences from 
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them show this lawsuit was filed because PKH provided bad legal advice to the City that 
cost it over $4 million. 
2. The City selected Snell & Wilmer to represent it. 
Second, the district court held that the City transferred control of the litigation to 
Cedar Valley by entering into the Contingent Fee Agreement, which purportedly required 
the City to be represented by a specific attorney agreed to by Cedar Valley. (R. 2634; R. 
2633 (citing R. 3365, at if D).) This, too, is not supported by the record. The City's 
administrator testified that the City chose Snell & Wilmer as the logical choice because it 
was already familiar with the facts, issues, and related documents. (R. 3831 at if 15.) The 
City's former mayor further testified that the City retained Snell & Wilmer because the 
City believed Snell & Wilmer could litigate the case effectively and efficiently. (R. 
3956-57 at if 13.) PKH never challenged the truth of this evidence. And contrary to the 
district court's ruling, the City (not Cedar Valley or anyone else) decided to retain Snell 
& Wilmer. Snell & Wilmer was the logical choice based on its knowledge of the facts 
and circumstances of the Underlying Lawsuit. 
3. Snell & Wilmer does not jointly represent the City and Cedar 
Valley in this case. 
Third, the district court held that the City transferred control of the litigation to 
Cedar Valley through the Contingent Fee Agreement, which purportedly allows Snell & 
Wilmer to jointly represent the City and Cedar Valley in this case. (R. 2634; R. 2633 
(citing R. 3367-68, at § 5).) This too is incorrect. When it was deposed, Cedar Valley 
retained separate counsel to represent it. Based on the undisputed facts, Cedar Valley is 
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neither a party to this case nor has any control of the litigation. (R. 1-24; R. 3 832 at iii! 
18-21; R. 3951 at~~ 3-5; R. 3956-58 at iii! 12-19.) 
4. Cedar Valley had no control of, or input about, the litigation 
of this case. 
Fourth, the district court held that under the Contingent Fee Agreement the City 
transferred control of the litigation to Cedar Valley by waiving client confidentiality and 
allowing Snell & Wilmer to disclose information regarding the litigation to Cedar Valley. 
(R. 2634; R. 2633 (citing R. 3367-68, at§ 5).) The fact is that Cedar Valley provided no 
input about, and had no control of, the litigation. The City administrator testified that 
neither he nor anyone at the City had any communications with Cedar Valley about 
prosecution of the claims or strategy. (R. 3832 at~ 21; see also R. 3951 at ii 4.) PKH 
never challenged the truth of that testimony. 
5. The City never received an offer it was inclined to accept. 
Finally, the district court held that the City transferred control of the litigation to 
Cedar Valley because the Agreements purportedly required Cedar Valley to approve a 
settlement. (R. 2634.) Approval is not necessary. If the City ever receives an offer it is 
inclined to accept, it can obtain that settlement over Cedar Valley's objections by simply 
establishing the reasonableness of the offer to a neutral arbitrator. (R. 3369 at § 7(b).) 
Thus, settlement can be achieved without Cedar Valley's approval. Finally, unless PKH 
makes a settlement offer the City is inclined to accept, Cedar Valley has no role at all in 
the decision process. It is undisputed that PKH never made a settlement offer the City 
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was inclined to accept. (R. 2380.) Thus, in fact, as opposed to hypothetically, no 
"control" of the litigation or settlement ever arose. 
C. The District Court Improperly Relied on Recitals. 
In addition to ignoring the undisputed record evidence that showed no assignment 
occurred here, the district court improperly relied on "recitals" as binding contract terms. 
Specifically, two of the district court's findings-that the filing of the lawsuit was a 
condition to settlement and the City was required to retain Snell & Wilmer-are 
improperly based on an interpretation of recitals, and not upon actual contract terms or 
surrounding circumstances. (See R. 2633 (citing R. 3365, at ifif C-D).) A recital is not a 
contractual term between the parties. See. e.g., Garrett v. Ellison, 72 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 
1937). 
In response, PKH argued that the City waived its right to argue that recitals are not 
contract terms because the City never raised this issue before the district court. (PKH Br. 
at 32.) But the issue regarding whether recitals are binding contract terms did not arise 
until the district court issued its ruling and held that certain recitals were binding contract 
terms. Thus the City had no opportunity to rebut this argument before the district court 
ruled. 
PKH further argues that Recital C of the Contingent Fee Agreement (which the 
district court improperly held required the City to file the lawsuit as a condition of 
settlement) is a binding contract term because it contains information that describes the 
parties' agreement. (PKH Br. at 32-33 (citing Paloni v. Beebe, 110 P.2d 563 (Utah 
1941).) Yet under Utah law, a contract term is only binding "to those elements or parts 
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of the writing which are contractual between the parties and not merely recitals of fact." 
Garrett, 72 P .2d at 451. In Paloni, the Utah Supreme Court held that some recitals can be 
contractual terms if they "'constitute[] an essential element of the contract." 110 P.2d at 
565. Here, Recital C is not an essential element of the Contingent Fee Agreement 
because it merely states that "[a]s part of the Settlement Agreement, City has agreed to 
make demand and if needed file and prosecute a complaint against PKH .... " (R. 3365, 
at Recital C.) Describing an agreement is not, itself, an agreement. Thus, it was error for 
the district court to construe Recital C as a contractual term. 
D. PKH's Opposition Brief Relies on Inapplicable Case Law. 
Much of PKH' s opposition brief is dedicated to a recitation of three cases PKH 
relied on heavily in its summary judgment briefing. (See PKH Br. at 24-31 (citing and 
analyzing Davis v. Scott, 320 S.W.3d 87 (Ky. 2010); Gurski v. Rosenblum & Filan. LLC, 
885 A.2d 163 (Conn. 2005); Greene v. Leasing Assocs .. Inc., 935 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. of App. 2006).) Each of these non-Utah cases is dissimilar to the facts here. 
1. Davis involved complete surrender of control. 
First, in Davis, an administrator was sued by a competitor for breach of a contract 
after receiving bad legal advice regarding the enforcement of the contract. 320 S.W.3d at 
89. The administrator settled the lawsuit with the competitor for $300,000. Id. The 
settlement agreement contained the following provisions: (1) the competitor "[i]n its 
discretion ... will secure the services of an attorney" to pursue the administrator's legal 
malpractice claim; (2) the administrator would cooperate with new legal counsel in the 
prosecution of the legal malpractice claim; (3) the administrator could not settle the 
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lawsuit "without the express written consent of [the competitor]"; (4) the parties agreed 
to enter into a common interest agreement; and ( 5) after payment of attorneys' fees and 
costs, the competitor would receive 80% and the administrator would receive 20% of any 
recovery. Id. After considering these factors, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
unsurprisingly held that "[t]he terms of the settlement agreement essentially placed the 
control of the malpractice suit in [the competitor's] hands and rendered [the 
administrator's] interest merely nominal. Id. at 91. 
Here, unlike in Davis, the City chose litigation counsel. (R. 3831atif15; R. 3956-
57 at if 13.) The City does not require the "express written consent" of Cedar Valley to 
settle the claim and Cedar Valley has had no input about, or control over, the litigation of 
the case. (PKH Br. at 19; see also R. 3369, at§ 7; R. 3832 at if 21; R. 3951 at if 4.) And 
the City and Cedar Valley agreed to share equally (50/50) in any recovery, after payment 
of attorneys' fees and litigation costs, which is much different than the competitor's right 
to "receive[] the lion's share of any judgment" as in the Davis case. 320 S. W.3d at 91. 
2. Gurski does not support dismissal. 
In Gurski, a bankruptcy debtor expressly "assign[ed] to [a creditor] the estate's 
interest in a certain legal malpractice claim." 885 A.2d at 165. The Gurski court 
followed the minority approach and held that it was "not persuaded that every voluntary 
assignment of a legal malpractice action should be barred as a matter of law." Id. at 171. 
But the court held "that public policy considerations warrant the barring of an assignment 
of a legal malpractice action to an adversary in the underlying litigation." Id. at 175. The 
major factor the court considered in making this ruling is whether the "assignment to an 
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adverse party in the underlying action ... would necessitate a duplicitous change in the 
positions taken by the parties in [the] antecedent litigation." Id. at 173 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
Here, unlike Gurski, there was no express assignment. More importantly, the 
Gurski court prohibited a debtor from selling its malpractice claim to a judgment creditor, 
which Utah law expressly permits. See Snow, 1999 UT 49 at iii! 10-11. Finally, the 
major public policy concern identified by Gurski-the role reversal taken by the 
parties-is inherent in all legal malpractice cases where a party's legal position turns out 
to have been premised on negligent legal advice. In all such cases the former client will 
pursue a different course of action. 
3. Greene involved surrender of control, not present here. 
Finally, in Greene a client sanctioned for pursuing a frivolous appeal settled his 
case with the adverse party. 935 So. 2d at 23. "As a condition of the settlement, [the 
client] agreed to pursue a malpractice action against [its attorney]" and use the proceeds 
to fully pay the adverse party's judgment before the client recovered anything. Id. The 
settlement agreement described the malpractice action as "the essence of th[ e] 
Agreement." Id. The settlement agreement required the client to retain certain counsel. 
Id. The court held that this was an invalid assignment because the client had "little actual 
control; the [client's] right to recover money was sixth on a list of prioritized categories 
and if it settled or dismissed the lawsuit without [counsel's] written consent" the client 
was responsible to counsel for damages. Id. at 25. 
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Again, this case is distinguishable. The City was inclined to seek a recovery from 
PKH regardless of the settlement. (R. 3831-32 at if 17; see also R. 3957 at if 15.) The 
City had actual control of the litigation, with no input from Cedar Valley. (R. 3 832 at if 
21; R. 3951 at if 4.) The City and Cedar Valley equally share in the recovery after 
payment of attorneys' fees and costs, rather than paying Cedar Valley first and leaving 
the City with any leftovers. (R. 3366, at §§ 1, 3; R. 3831-32 at if 17.) The City selected 
counsel, not Cedar Valley. (R. 3831 at if 15; R. 3956-57 at if 13). Finally, Cedar Valley 
cannot stop a settlement. (PKH Br. at 19; see also R. 3369, at§ 7). And in the event of 
no recovery, the City does not have to pay Snell & Wilmer, or Cedar Valley, any fees or 
damages. (R. 3366.) 
E. It Is Improper to Speculate about Future Events or to Rely on 
"Facts" Not Found bv the District Court. 
Presumably recognizing that these cases are distinguishable from the facts of this 
case, PKH attempted to bolster the Order by speculating about future events or new 
"facts" not relied on by the district Court. For example, PKH argued that Cedar Valley 
has significant control over settlement negotiations because if the City and Cedar Valley 
"reach[] the point of a mandatory arbitration, then they are adversaries in the arbitration, 
and under the terms of the [Contingent Fee Agreement], [Snell & Wilmer] can represent 
[Cedar Valley] against [the City]." (PKH Br. at 28.) The Contingent Fee Agreement 
says no such thing. In fact, it provides that Snell & Wilmer "shall not represent either of 
the Clients or otherwise participate in the arbitration. If [Cedar Valley and the City] want 
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to be represented in the arbitration, each of the Clients must retain its own legal counsel." 
(R. 3369, at §7(e) (emphasis added).) 
Moreover, PKH argued that Cedar Valley's "interest in the Malpractice Case 
plainly exceeds the interest of [the City]" because Cedar Valley "pays all the costs of the 
Malpractice Case and is entitled to reimbursement up front of those costs." (PKH Br. at 
27 (emphasis in original).) The district court never made this finding, and the record 
does not support it. The mere fact that Cedar Valley is entitled to a reimbursement of 
litigation costs it paid does not mean its interest exceeds the City's interest. Once the 
monies advanced are netted out, Cedar Valley and the City equally share in any recovery. 
And the City is entitled to the same reimbursement of costs. (See PKH Br. at n.62 (the 
Contingent Fee Agreement "provides that [the City] is to be reimbursed its costs incurred 
in the Underlying Case").) In other words, both Cedar Valley and the City are entitled to 
be reimbursed for their costs in the Underlying Lawsuit. 
Next, PKH argued that the City is incentivized not to dispute Cedar Valley's 
"interpretation of the Settlement Agreement" because in the event of a dispute the City 
would be forced to retain new counsel and "incur fees for separate counsel." (PKH Br. at 
28.) PKH argued that this "adds to [Cedar Valley's] overall control of the Malpractice 
Case." (PKH Br. at 28.) Yet the district court never came to PKH's curious conclusion 
that one party having to spend money amounted to control over the other party spending 
money. 
Finally, PKH alleged that the City cannot independently settle this lawsuit because 
"[Cedar Valley] would undoubtedly claim that [the City] was in breach of the 
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[Agreements]." (PKH Br. at 28.) Nowhere in the record is there any evidence that Cedar 
Valley has, or would, allege the City breached the Agreements to stop a settlement. Most 
importantly, the district court made no such finding. 
F. The Public Policy Reasons for Disallowin2 the Assignment of a 
Legal Malpractice Claim Are Not Present Here. 
1. The City and Cedar Valley did not collude. 
PKH admits no actual collusion occurred here. Instead, PKH argued that "actual 
collusion does not have to be presented for public policy concerns to be triggered" and 
that "[a]n opportunity and incentive for collusion clearly exist in this case." (PKH Br. 
35.) According to PKH, "nothing ... prevents [the City] and [Cedar Valley] from 
stipulating to artificially inflated damages and using the inflated stipulation as grounds 
for an unjustly high damage award .... " (PKH Br. at 35.) While such collusion could 
conceivably have occurred years ago, the fact is it did not. 
There is no allegation that the City stipulated to damages in exchange for an 
agreement from Cedar Valley not to collect and instead to take an assignment of a legal 
malpractice claim. PKH knows that the City has suffered actual, cash damages to avoid 
the risk of an $8 million judgment PKH warned it about. And even if the Agreements 
could be characterized as a partial, implied assignment, Utah law does not prohibit this 
kind of assignment because there is no collusion. A consideration of the remaining 
public policy concerns analyzed by other courts does not change this result. 
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2. The City did not exploit or merchandise its malpractice claim. 
PKH argued that the City exploited its legal malpractice claim by using it to 
negotiate a more favorable settlement. (PKH Br. at 33-34.) In its ruling, the district court 
quoted Picadilly. Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ind. 1991), for the proposition that 
legal malpractice claims should not be assignable because "[t]he assignment of such 
claims could relegate the legal malpractice action to the market place and convert it to a 
commodity to be exploited and transferred to economic bidders who have never had a 
professional relationship with the attorney." (R. 2637-38 (citing Goodley, 62 Cal. App. 
3d at 389).) First, Utah law allows a complete stranger to the attorney-client relationship 
to purchase a malpractice claim at a bankruptcy sale and then bring suit. More 
importantly, perhaps, the district court never analyzed (or concluded) whether the facts of 
this case gave rise to the public policy concern identified in Picadilly. They do not. 
The City never placed its legal malpractice claim up for bid, let alone exploited or 
transferred it to economic bidders. Rather, the City offered to share proceeds of a suit. 
The City brought the malpractice claim in its own name, controls the litigation, and 
stands to recover substantially from any judgment against PKH. And as detailed above, 
the Utah Supreme Court has authorized a judgment creditor to execute on a legal 
malpractice claim and conduct a private or public sale, which would result in the legal 
malpractice claim being exploited as a commodity. Snow, 1999 UT 49 at ifif 10-11. Utah 
law does not bar the cost-funding arrangement here. 
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3. The sanctity of the attorney-client relationship is preserved. 
PKH next argued that the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship is destroyed 
because the City can share its attorney-client communications with Cedar Valley. (PKH 
Br. at 34.) As detailed in the City's opening brief, the facts of this case do not implicate 
this policy concern. (City Br. at 27-29.) Rather than address the City's arguments, PKH 
simply argues that the City's private communications with PKH are open to Cedar 
Valley-the City's former adversary. (PKH Br. at 34.) Yet this is true regardless of 
whether there has been an assignment or even whether a legal malpractice claim has been 
asserted, because a client is free to share its private attorney-client communications with 
anyone it wants. The attorney-client relationship is designed to protect and benefit the 
client, not the attorney, and it can be voluntarily waived by a client. See. e.g., State v. 
Johnson, 2008 UT App 5, ~ 20, 178 P.3d 915. Regardless, the facts here show Cedar 
Valley was not included in the City's litigation strategies and decisions. 
4. Role reversal is inherent in all malpractice cases. 
Finally, PKH argued that the "role reversal" that inevitably occurs in all legal 
malpractice claims is present here. (PKH Br. at 36-37.) There is no question that in the 
Underlying Lawsuit the City "argued that the triggering events for collection and 
payment of the water impact fees had not occurred" but here the City "has shifted its 
position and adopted [Cedar Valley's] molecule theory argument .... " (PKH Br. at 36.) 
This change in position is inherent in any legal malpractice case. It is no surprise that 
after the court in the Underlying Lawsuit rejected the City's PKH-advised positions, the 
City now relies on positions the court found to be valid. The City relied on PKH' s 
20 
negligent advice for years and defended itself based on that negligent advice. Now, after 
paying millions of dollars to settle the Underlying Lawsuit, the City's position is that 
Cedar Valley was likely to prevail in the Underlying Lawsuit, and therefore it was 
reasonable for the City to settle and seek relief from the party who caused the City's 
injury-PKH. The law does not prohibit the rejection of bad advice. 
G. PKH's Request for Dismissal with Prejudice Is Improper. 
Without appealing the district court's decision, PKH requests that this Court 
reverse the district court's dismissal without prejudice and remand to the district court 
with a mandate requiring dismissal with prejudice. (PKH Br. at 37.) This Court should 
decline PKH's invitation because PKH is legally precluded from extending it. PKH 
failed to file a cross-appeal in this case. See. e.g., Halladay v. Cluff, 739 P.2d 643, 645 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Cross-appeals are properly limited to grievances a party has with 
the judgment as it was entered .... "). Wisely, PKH quickly abandoned this two-
sentence argument. (See PKH Br. at 37.) 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY INTERFERING WITH 
THE CITY'S CHOICE OF COUNSEL. 
PKH' s last self-serving overture was to argue that the City should be deprived of 
Snell & Wilmer as legal counsel with approximately eight years' experience with these 
facts. PKH' s desperation to burden the City with entirely new counsel is evident from its 
willingness to characterize the Order with restrictions the district court never imposed. 
PKH argued that the Order concluded that the City "is not to be represented by any 
attorney who is or has been associated with [Cedar Valley]." (PKH Br. at 40 (emphasis 
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added).) Those words never came from the district court. Rather, the district court ruled 
that the City must "establish ... that [it] is not represented by attorneys associated with 
[Cedar Valley]." (R. 2641.) In other words, PKH's ad lib is just that. 
PKH then argued that the Order effectively disqualified Snell & Wilmer. (PKH 
Br. at 38-42.) But the Order neither mentions nor specifically disqualifies Snell & 
Wilmer. The Court should reject PKH's argument on this basis alone. But even if PKH 
was right, the Order should be reversed for multiple reasons. 
First, PKH admitted it did not file a separate motion to disqualify, but argues-
without any supporting legal authority-that a separate motion was not required. (PKH 
Br. at 38-39.) Under Utah law, "[a] request for an order must be made by motion." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 7(b). If the district court intended to disqualify Snell & Wilmer, it could easily 
have said so. And if PKH's intent was to seek disqualification, Snell & Wilmer should 
have an opportunity to oppose such a request. In reversing the district court's decision, 
this Court should clarify that even if PKH had made such a motion, PKH had already 
waived its right to seek disqualification by not filing a motion to disqualify immediately 
on its becoming aware of the basis for the disqualification. See. e.g., D.J. Inv. Group. 
LLC. v. DAE/Westbrook, LLC, 2007 UT App 207, ~ 6, 113 P.3d 1022 (denying a motion 
to disqualify as untimely because it was not "immediately filed and diligently pursued as 
soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for disqualification") (internal quotation 
marks and emphasis omitted). 
Second, PKH argued that Snell & Wilmer's disqualification is warranted because 
certain "conflicts" exist with Snell & Wilmer's representation of the City. (PKH Br. at 
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39.) Of course PKH cannot assert these "conflict" issues here because PKH never raised 
them with the district court. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,-r 11, 10 P.3d 346 ("As a 
general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal."). Even 
if PKH had raised these supposed conflicts before the district court, a request for 
disqualification by showing a serious potential of conflict still requires a separate and 
fully-briefed motion, and it must be "immediately filed and diligently pursued as soon as 
the party becomes aware of the basis for disqualification." D.J. Inv. Group, 2007 UT 
App 207 at ,-i 6. Additionally, even assuming there were conflicts, this would be the 
City's (or Cedar Valley's) argument to assert, not PKH's. 
Third, PKH argued that the Order "did not violate [the City's] ability to choose its 
counsel." (PKH Br. at 38.) But in the next breath, PKH asserts that Snell & Wilmer had 
to be disqualified "because [the City] cannot have its adversary's lawyer represent it in 
the Malpractice Case." (PKH Br. at 40.) PKH cannot have it both ways. Either the City 
can choose its attorney or it cannot. This Court should recognize the City's inherent right 
to counsel of its choice. 
Finally, PKH, anticipating that Snell & Wilmer could terminate its association 
with Cedar Valley, argued that "[e]ven if [Snell & Wilmer] were to cease its 
representation of [Cedar Valley], an 'association' would still exist ... based on their 
previous interactions, representations and dealings .... " (PKH Br. at 41.) This ignores 
the law. Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.9. If that were the law, firms would regularly be 
disqualified from representing clients based on their "previous interactions, 
representations and dealings" of former clients. The fact remains the district court never 
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said Snell & Wilmer could not represent the City. PKH' s attempt to disqualify Snell & 
Wilmer from this case has nothing to do with ethics, and everything to do with putting 
the City at a strategic disadvantage. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth herein and in the City's opening brief, the City 
respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment and remand to the district court for proceeding with expert discovery (fact 
discovery is over) and a trial on the merits. The City further requests that the Court make 
clear that Snell & Wilmer may continue as counsel to the City, with or without a present 
association with Cedar Valley. Finally, if the Court determines that concurrent 
representation of the City and Cedar Valley is problematic for the City continuing its 
claims against PKH, this Court should clarify that the problem is remedied by the 
termination of all engagements between Snell & Wilmer and Cedar Valley. 
DATED this 21st day of September, 2016. 
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